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1. Leadership, care and (in)justice
Leah Tomkins
In this chapter, I deepen the exploration of care and caring leadership as 
relationships of power. Connecting with care ethicists’ discussions of the 
interplay between care and justice, I probe some of the ways in which care can 
involve and inscribe injustice. This provides some scene-setting for the book 
as a whole, because many of the chapters engage both explicitly and implicitly 
with the risk and/or reality of injustice, and how the dynamics of care can bring 
about advantage and disadvantage for both leaders and followers.
CARE AND JUSTICE
In recent decades, care theory has mostly been developed by feminist philoso-
phers. Carol Gilligan is generally held to have mobilised contemporary interest 
in care ethics, portraying care as a feminine moral voice, which is grounded in 
commitment to relationship (Gilligan, 1982). This is contrasted with an ethics 
of justice, which involves an abstract, universal morality and a distinctively 
masculine voice. With Gilligan’s moral voice of care, actions are motivated by 
a concern for how they will affect other people (will this person be upset by 
what I do?), rather than a concern for universal justice and impartiality (is this 
right or wrong?).
For many feminist writers in the 1970s and 1980s, interest in care arose from 
a concern about the amount of unpaid and unacknowledged work performed 
by women within the family. This work prevented women from pursuing 
careers outside the home and hence denied them access to economic and 
professional identity and autonomy. Such a state of affairs allowed care to be 
cast as a ‘labour of love’, and care-giving to be associated with material and 
political disadvantage. As Finch and Groves (1983, p. 2) suggest, the feminist 
writing in this era focused on ‘the tension between women’s economic inde-
pendence (actual, potential or desired), and their traditional role as front-line, 
unpaid “carers”’.
With this association with women’s unpaid labour, care ethics has a strong 
maternalist aspect, at least in its origins. However, care’s roots in the home and 
with the mother-figure do not mean that this is the only domain it can either 
illuminate or inform (Noddings, 2002). The suggestion in the Introduction 
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of Jeremy Corbyn as an apparently caring leader helps to make this point. 
Thus, the gender associations of care-giving are not uniquely maternal or 
even female. In several chapters in this book, care-giving is associated with 
(a usually, but not always, benign) paternalism, both at the level of society 
and at the level of the family. When care is cast as paternalism, the injustices 
experienced by women shift from the disadvantages of care-giving to those of 
care-receiving; women move from being trapped in the home because they are 
needed too much to being trapped in socially constructed identities of inequal-
ity, where they are positioned as being in need. Whether giving or receiving 
care, justice seems to be particularly illusive for women.
Gilligan’s distinction between the female and male moral voice put the 
relationship between care and justice onto centre stage of social and institu-
tional theory. Gilligan originally developed care ethics explicitly in contrast to 
justice, highlighting care as a concern for the particular, as opposed to justice 
as a concern for the universal. Others have queried such a contrast, arguing that 
emphasising care as a wholly particularist, contextual morality deprives both 
care-givers and care-recipients of their rights, making it difficult to disentangle 
care, exploitation and even abuse. Theorists of care as political orientation, 
such as Tronto (1993) and Held (2006), argue that valorising personal caring 
without simultaneously attending to issues of social justice means naturalising 
and legitimising women’s place within the home, without the opportunities 
that should be afforded to all. Instead, care should be seen as an overall frame-
work of social morality and maturity, within which justice is also applied. For 
instance, Engster (2007, p. 13) sees care as a general moral and political theory 
of obligation, which is ‘equally accessible to both men and women and univer-
sally obligatory for all capable human beings’. From this perspective, justice is 
enabled through our attentiveness, appreciation, and feelings of commitment 
towards other people.
The interplay between the particularity of care and the universality of 
justice highlights the significance of power, not least because it highlights the 
power dynamics of the choice over who receives our attention and solicitude. 
Power is, of course, central to the question of leadership, and arguably the core 
concern of critical organisational scholars (Collinson, 2011). In exploring the 
nuances of power, critical scholars and care ethicists alike distinguish between 
a commandeering power-over, a facilitative power-to and a more collaborative 
power-with (Hartsock, 1983; Haugaard, 2012). There is also much contem-
porary interest in the Foucauldian notion of bio-power, in which power (and 
subjugation) are enmeshed with prevailing norms about the sort of person we 
are supposed to be, and where discourse regulates our internal feelings, not 
just our external performances as ‘good leaders’, ‘good employees’, ‘good 
citizens’, and so on (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002). All these aspects of power 
find an expression in the ways in which care is experienced, felt, resisted, 
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normalised and legitimised, and in particular, whether it incorporates or stands 
in contrast to justice. Care can both empower and disempower care-givers and 
care-recipients. Care both gives and saps energy and the power-to make things 
happen; and it both grants and denies access to power in the form of resources. 
This takes us way past any sense that care is just about nice feelings, and 
into a world where care can make a forcible difference to how events unfold: 
‘Those adept in the skills of care, of defusing conflicts before they become 
violent, of settling disputes among those who cannot just leave but must learn 
to get along with one another, have much to teach peacemakers and peacekeep-
ers in other domains.’ (Held, 2006, p. 151).
CARE AND (IN) JUSTICE
Of crucial concern to these debates is the argument that care ethics produces 
and reinforces a power imbalance between those who provide and those who 
receive care, thereby creating a kind of injustice. Such injustice is usually 
assumed to be disadvantage or denigration for care-recipients who, by exten-
sion, are usually deemed to be followers in the leader/follower relationship. 
This concern is exacerbated by definitions of care based on identifying and 
addressing people’s needs, and the often negative connotations of needs and 
neediness.
Reflecting on the issue of needs in relation to care and justice, Noddings 
(2015, p. 72) suggests that: ‘Justice is a rights-based ethic and care is 
needs-based … the concept of needs is more basic than that of rights. Indeed, 
it seems that rights begin as expressed needs (or wants) and become rights 
when claimants finally can exercise the power to satisfy their needs.’ From 
this perspective, needs are the property of the disempowered, at least whilst 
they are experienced and perhaps acknowledged, but as yet unmet. Once a way 
has been found to satisfy such needs, the previously disempowered become 
empowered, and needs become rights. But care is thus a kind of pre-justice.
Of course, much depends on what we mean by ‘needs’. One person’s need 
is another person’s wish, hope or expectation. As we know from the ubiquitous 
Maslowian hierarchy, not all needs have the same quality or motivational 
value: some are basic, and overlap with universal human rights, whereas others 
are more orientated towards individual satisfaction or fulfilment. And lest we 
assume that care is necessarily needs-based, we should remember the distinc-
tion between caring-for and caring-about. The former has strong associations 
with need (though not necessarily with morality, principles or love); the latter 
is not so clearly based on need (though more easily associable with morality, 
principles and love).
Grounding care in the concept of needs begs the question of how we truly 
know what other people need. It highlights the importance – and complexity 
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– of distinguishing between expressed and inferred or imagined needs. As 
Tronto (2015, p. 34) explains, ‘there is a “politics of needs interpretation” 
that makes some needs politically disabling compared to others’. Several of 
the chapters in this book engage with the politics of a care which is offered 
– however good the intentions – based on the assumption rather than establish-
ment of other people’s needs, and with the risks thereof for both care-givers 
and care-recipients, both leaders and followers.
Tronto (1993), amongst others, emphasises that care-recipients should be 
involved in identifying and articulating their own needs, rather than having 
them assumed by others. This is an attractive argument, but it raises significant 
questions for how care ethics might inform relations between leaders and 
followers, or indeed, between other groups of people with unequal experience 
or capability, such as parents and children. As any parent will tell you, relying 
on a child’s identification of need is likely to result in ice-cream, not broccoli! 
My six-year-old nephew, Charlie, frequently assures me that he really needs 
chocolate!
Bubeck (1995) argues that the needs which are met through care are 
precisely those things that a person cannot do for him/herself. An activity – 
however kind or considerate – does not count as care if it is something which 
a healthy adult is capable of doing for him/herself, at least in principle. For 
Bubeck (1995, p. 132), this means that:
The housewife cooking a meal for her husband is providing a service, whilst her 
cooking the same meal for an infant would be care … [The needs of care] are 
absolute in that they make those in need necessarily depend on others. Thus a child 
cannot bring herself up, nor can a bedridden person provide food for herself, nor can 
somebody in need of talking a problem over with somebody talk to herself.
Bubeck’s definition causes difficulties for the concept of self-care, which 
becomes oxymoronic; but it helps to ground discussions of care in the concept 
of dependency, highlighting the power dynamics of a relationship where one 
person depends on another for things that he/she perhaps cannot do alone. 
On the surface, at least, such dependency dynamics seem to lead inescapa-
bly to relations of inequality and disadvantage, with care-givers necessarily 
more powerful, privileged, capable and/or insightful than care-recipients. 
The emphasis on care-recipients’ dependency triggers associations with 
inadequacy or inferiority, especially when applied to adults (for infants and, 
to a lesser extent, the elderly, are somewhat more exempt from the stigma of 
dependency). This is one of the most persistent concerns amongst theorists 
working with care ethics, both in the specifically caring professions and in 
broader social, political and institutional relations.
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INJUSTICE FOR FOLLOWERS?
Associations between care, needs/neediness, dependency and inferiority help 
to explain the caution, even suspicion, that some critical organisational schol-
ars have about applying care ethics to leadership relations. The concern is 
captured in the notion of ‘asymmetry’ in the relationship between leaders and 
followers, which is usually assumed to invoke privilege for the former and 
injustice (whether actual or potential) for the latter.
For many critical scholars, one of the biggest problems in contemporary 
institutional life is that individual leaders have been given too much power 
and licence, and allowed to believe that the rules which apply to others do 
not apply to them. Tourish (2013) highlights the particular case of ‘trans-
formational leadership’ as an approach which legitimises an extraordinary 
concentration of power and agency in the hands of the special few, who accept 
their mission to ‘transform’ the world and the people around them. Such con-
centrated, almost messianic power makes it more likely that relations between 
leaders and followers will involve exploitation of the latter by the former. 
From this perspective, any theory that formalises, strengthens or naturalises 
the individual leader’s superior position is bound to come under suspicion 
from critical scholars. The asymmetries of care feed such suspicion in spades.
Concerns about the ethical ramifications of leader-centric approaches have 
contributed to a burgeoning ‘post-heroic’ perspective in leadership studies, 
including ‘distributed’ (Gronn, 2002) and ‘shared’ (Pearce and Manz, 2005) 
leadership. They have inspired calls for the study of ‘leadership, not leaders’ 
(Crevani et al., 2010) and the ‘leaderful’ organisation (Raelin, 2011). Such 
approaches urge us to see organisational power as something which unfolds 
in interactions between people, suggesting that leadership involves something 
other than simply what an individual leader does (or is). Both tacitly and 
explicitly, they problematise asymmetry between leaders and followers.
The contributors to this book take different positions on this issue of care’s 
asymmetry and its disadvantages for followers as care-recipients. Some are 
sceptical about any ethical system based on the assumption of need/neediness, 
however benignly felt or expressed. In this, they connect with social theorists, 
especially those concerned with disability rights, who contest the concept of 
care for valorising those who provide care over those who receive it, and for 
the resulting pernicious construction of care-recipients as lacking agency, that 
is, as not quite fully human.
Others – myself included – engage with care ethics precisely to expose 
and scrutinise the asymmetries of power, and to frame our thinking in ways 
which recognise differences of capability, expertise, experience and need, 
but without impoverishment or exploitation of the care-recipient, or follower. 
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An ethics of care should not have to either assume or reinforce the passivity 
or inferiority of the care-recipient; that is, the need for (or indeed, enjoyment 
of) care does not necessarily have to be equated with inadequacy. From this 
perspective, care ethics might help us to move past simplistic binary assump-
tions of leaders with all the power and privilege, and followers with all the 
disadvantage and exploitation.
Amongst care ethicists, a range of propositions have been offered for a care 
which is fundamentally empowering rather than disempowering. For instance, 
Tronto (2015) sees care as a political philosophy geared towards social 
transformation, which is less heroically constructed than its organizational 
counterpart, ‘transformational leadership’. Because care is something we all 
need and experience at some stage in our lives, it is precisely through care that 
we approach the question of democracy. In other words, the very nucleus of 
care is something universal and equal, and therefore potentially a force for, not 
against, fairness, equivalence and justice.
Confronting the apparent paradox of democracy’s emphasis on equality and 
care’s emphasis on inequality, Tronto suggests that any particular act of care is 
necessarily unequal between care-giver and care-recipient, but that we should 
hope and expect to even this out across a life-time:
What makes care equal is not the perfection of an individual caring act, but that we 
can trust that over time, we will be able to reciprocate the care we received from 
fellow citizens, and that they will reciprocate the care we’ve given to them. In such 
an ongoing pattern of care, we can expect moral virtues to deepen: We will trust in 
one another and in our social and political institutions. (Tronto, 2015, p.14)
For Tronto, therefore, the path to justice lies in acknowledging that we all 
have a right to receive care, not just in the obvious sense that we all need care 
in infancy and old age, but more broadly, that we deserve to be cared-for/
cared-about even as adults who are also capable of independent agency, 
responsibility and indeed, leadership.
In a complementary vein, Kittay (2013) argues that policies based on 
principles of equality have not actually helped to lessen disadvantage or 
injustice, and that we should develop more nuanced understandings of human 
dependency rather than trying to theorise or wish it away. She challenges us to 
interrogate why we so despise dependency, recalling how, when US presiden-
tial candidate, Mitt Romney, labelled roughly half the population ‘dependent’, 
‘the remark was widely perceived as an insult significant enough to negatively 
influence the outcome of his presidential bid’ (Kittay, 2015, p. 54). In denying 
that we are sometimes dependent on others, ‘we might as well decry our 
dependence on air’ (ibid.). This is not to romanticise dependency, nor to deny 
that the experience of dependency often involves anger, frustration and help-
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lessness. However, there are also positive aspects, such as the way in which 
dependency can be enmeshed in feelings of belonging. Dependency is not 
always easy, but it is not to be denied.
Kittay proposes the expression ‘dependency work’ to capture the experi-
ence of attending to those who need us. ‘Dependency work’ is less emotive 
than ‘care’, and perhaps more accurately and pragmatically focused on 
what is actually involved. When cast as ‘dependency work’, the dynamic is 
one of responsibility towards the other person, but one which differentiates 
between power and domination. Recalling the notion of power-with rather 
than power-over, harm can be done if either partner in the relationship abuses 
this moral and emotional contract, highlighting the vulnerability of all our 
human relations – both in dependency and in ‘dependency work’. Rather than 
presuming, asserting or hoping that everyone is always equally capable and 
independent, Kittay’s challenge is to distinguish between those inequalities 
that are inevitable and possibly productive, and those which are not inevitable 
and should therefore be resisted.
Both Tronto and Kittay offer a powerful counterbalance to assumptions 
that the vulnerability of care only applies to the less overtly powerful in social 
and institutional life. Both highlight the mutual responsibility for care which, 
extrapolated into the realm of organisations, means that followers are also 
accountable for how care is – or is not – put into practice, and whether its man-
ifestation is closer to justice or injustice. Moreover, their work draws attention 
to the care that leaders themselves need, and poses important questions for how 
we might even out the experiences of giving and receiving care for everyone in 
our organisations and institutions.
INJUSTICE FOR LEADERS?
Instead of assuming that asymmetry automatically privileges leaders, we 
should reflect on how care might involve disadvantage, even injustice, for 
leaders. Seen in terms of Kittay’s ‘dependency workers’, leaders are not only 
required to respond sensitively and capably to followers’ dependency, but 
can themselves be made dependent by virtue of their dedication to this work; 
and it is conceivable that we might call this exploitation, even abuse. This is 
a somewhat contentious line to take in critical organisational theorising, but it 
is one worth examining if we are to work towards more collectively satisfying 
organisational relations.
Here, discussions amongst care ethicists help to frame the issue very pow-
erfully. It is much easier to envisage how care-givers in the domestic sphere 
might be exploited in their care work than to suggest that organisational 
leaders might be exploited or exploitable in a similar way. Whilst we rarely, 
if ever, hear commentators say ‘oh, that poor leader’, thinking or hearing ‘oh, 
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that poor carer’ feels much more likely. That care can be a burden which risks 
erasing a care-giver’s sense of independent self is hardly news to anyone who 
has ever been in a care-giving role, whether for a child, an elderly parent or 
somebody else in our lives who is in need of help, especially of the hands-on, 
caring-for variety.
Indeed, one of the earliest objections in the modern care ethics movement 
was that care-giving is a kind of ‘slave morality’, which legitimises the oppres-
sion of women and other socially or economically disadvantaged groups. 
The notion of care as ‘slave morality’ draws on the philosophy of Frederick 
Nietzsche, who held that oppressed groups often develop moral theories that 
construct their own subservience and self-sacrifice as virtue. Drawing on this 
Nietzschean theme, Card (1990) argues that a sharp differentiation between 
care (valorising the particular and the proximal) and justice (venerating the 
universal) can distort ethics by endorsing closeness, familiarity, similarity and 
relatedness and thereby promoting racism, xenophobia and a disregard for the 
Other. Rather than encouraging an openness to the world, therefore, care ethics 
can isolate the care-giver from the world, practically, psychologically and 
politically. This pushes what happens between care-giver and care-recipient 
‘behind closed doors’ and subject to idiosyncratic, private rules rather than 
general standards of relationship and behaviour. When we are enveloped in 
such idiosyncrasy and particularity, the idea of care-giving as being so attuned 
to another person that we can see the world through his/her eyes no longer feels 
like the mark of healthy empathy, emotional generosity and mutual under-
standing. Instead, it reminds us of what slaves and servants do: ‘We can take 
up the perspective of others out of sheer necessity for survival, the necessity 
to anticipate others’ needs in order to be a good servant or slave, for example. 
Women learn well to do this with men; slaves have learned well to do it with 
masters.’ (Card, 1990, p. 106).
Seen this way, extolling care as an ethical ideal risks trapping people in 
unhealthy relationships from which neither side can escape, at least, not 
without censure. A relationship’s positive public face can mask misery behind 
the scenes. Walking away from care may feel like it is a personal, ethical 
failure, but it is better to do this than allow oneself to be exploited through the 
relationship. Leaders can walk away more readily than domestic ‘slaves’, of 
course, but it is probably never easy. Thus, care-giving may only superficially 
be something that enriches our relationship with the world, and instead may 
operate as a kind of false consciousness that equates virtue with self-sacrifice.1
Within contemporary organisations, how might such slavery, self-sacrifice 
and false consciousness come about for caring leaders who, by virtue of their 
position, are supposed to be the ones with power, and sometimes too much of 
it? As I suggested above, it is unusual to detect much sympathy for leaders, 
especially in critical scholarly circles. In my view, however, we should 
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suspend our hostilities towards leaders and try to understand the complexities 
of their work, rather than continue to use leaders as handy scapegoats for all 
our projected disappointments and frustrations with the world. Leaders are 
not an economically or politically disadvantaged group in the same way that 
women have historically been oppressed through the gendered domesticity of 
care-giving; but leaders might well be emotionally exploited through the care 
relationship. The ‘slavery’ experiences of care-givers brought to life by Card 
(1990) and others illuminate the isolation and stress that leaders can experi-
ence, but which usually go unremarked. Just as care-givers sometimes live in 
survival-mode, trying to anticipate and meet a care-recipient’s demands, rea-
sonable or otherwise, so leaders are often also in survival mode, especially in 
regimes of extensive employee consultation, engagement and empowerment.
Elsewhere (Tomkins, 2019), I argue that promoting ‘leadership, not leaders’ 
in theories such as distributed and shared leadership feeds a therapeutic fiction. 
It heralds the possibility of collective empowerment amongst all organisational 
members, and the creativity and innovation that such empowerment is said to 
foster. However, it also masks the considerable work undertaken by leaders 
to make distributed leadership seem possible. Invoking Badaracco’s (2002) 
‘quiet leader’, who implements strategy through barely noticeable nudges 
rather than grand gestures, I argue that just because such efforts are subtle or 
surreptitious does not mean that ‘leadership’ has replaced ‘leaders’. Indeed, 
discourses of follower empowerment and inclusivity risk creating another kind 
of disadvantage, namely leaders who, when exercising their responsibility and 
expertise, must also make the workings of at least some of this responsibility 
and expertise invisible. So, whilst critical colleagues argue that ‘employee 
empowerment’ is a neo-liberal fiction, whose victims are organisational 
members absorbing an excessive, individualised pressure and guilt, I suggest 
that this is a fiction which panders to fantasies of symmetry and equality, 
whose victims are often leaders.
Just as care-givers may feel trapped and unable to walk away from relation-
ships of abuse (because care is such an unimpeachable moral good), so leaders 
(and leadership scholars) risk censorship if they do not support ‘leadership, 
not leaders’ (because employee empowerment is such an unimpeachable and 
progressive institutional good). Just as Card’s (1990) servants are hyper-alert 
to the mood-music of their masters, so contemporary ‘masters’ of organisation 
must stay hyper-alert to the mood-music of their increasingly empowered 
stakeholders. The therapeutic fiction of ‘employee empowerment’ allows us to 
critique care’s asymmetry on behalf of followers, but often masks the costs of 
asymmetry for leaders.
Many of the chapters in this book wrestle with the power asymmetries 
of caring leadership. Particularly relevant for my argument here is Yiannis 
Gabriel’s discussion of leaders as the product of followers’ projections and 
Leah Tomkins - 9781788975506
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/03/2020 03:41:32PM
via free access
Leadership, care and (in)justice 25
fantasies, based on archetypes of father and mother (Chapter 3). From this 
perspective, followers’ demands of their leaders are based on primal emo-
tions, and have no obligation to be reasonable, logical or mature. Followers’ 
anxieties and fantasies often collide, leaving both parents and leaders having 
to absorb and contain whatever emotional theatrics are projected onto them.
It strikes me that the loneliness – indeed, slavery – of the leader lies in 
having to sustain and tolerate followers’ fantasies of symmetry and empow-
erment (fuelled by discourses of ‘leadership, not leaders’), whilst remaining 
able and willing to restore fantasies of containment and protection, as required. 
Followers enjoy symmetry qua empowerment when things are going well, and 
asymmetry qua protection when they are not. If leaders get this protection/
emancipation balance wrong, they either become too interventionist and 
directive, shattering fantasies of equality; or they become too distant and 
laissez-faire, leaving them vulnerable to the charge of not caring (Tomkins and 
Simpson, 2015). For me, the central paradox of caring leadership is enveloped 
in these constantly shifting dynamics of symmetry/asymmetry, indeed, of 
justice/care. Caring leaders have to be hyper-alert to this mood-music, making 
their ‘dependency work’ complex, exhausting and lonely.
Moreover, if the roots of care lie in the family, then followers may uncon-
sciously feel entitled to special benefits of family membership, such as uncon-
ditional loyalty, favouritism and patronage. Through this prism, followers 
not only expect their leaders to be genuinely concerned for their well-being; 
they also expect to be given preferential treatment over those who do not 
belong to this particular family unit. If organisational members, encouraged 
by discourses of distributed and shared leadership, absorb the specialness of 
care and the equality of justice, no wonder our organisations are spaces of 
such conflict, contradiction and disappointment, with ample opportunity for 
injustice throughout.
Furthermore, I think that care ethics helps to make sense of some of the 
antipathy towards leaders in certain academic quarters. By highlighting care 
as attention to the particular and the proximal, care emphasises the comfort 
of relationships of familiarity. Just as Card (1990) worries that care ethics 
promotes xenophobia, so critical scholars’ hostility to corporate leaders may 
be because, by dint of their unfamiliarity, these leaders are cast as Other. This 
is one of many arguments for greater dialogue between academia and practice, 
so that scholars might develop greater empathy for the challenges of leadership 
in practice, and practitioners might benefit from the ways in which critical 
scholarship can expose their taken-for-granted assumptions, and foster poten-
tially more ethical and more meaningful conversations about organisational 
dilemmas.
Leaders must, of course, take their fair share of the blame for what is wrong 
in our organisations and institutions. The experience of following can be 
Leah Tomkins - 9781788975506
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/03/2020 03:41:32PM
via free access
Paradox and power in caring leadership26
intensely frustrating, disappointing and infantilising, and followers have to 
absorb their leaders’ unresolved emotional theatrics as much as vice versa. 
But just as leaders should not be given all the credit for organisational success, 
they should also not be given all the blame for organisational failure. An ethics 
of care highlights the paradoxical and often unreasonable and irreconcilable 
demands of leadership, and the ways in which the dynamics of leader/follower 
relations involve continual tension between justice and injustice for all of us 
in institutional life.
NOTE
1. Whilst most commentators probably view self-sacrifice as problematic, Van 
Nistelrooij (2014) sees positive aspects of the sacrifices of care. If the self is 
ontologically one of interrelationship, then self-sacrifice can be part of a dignified 
and fulfilling identity construction. Self-sacrifice is no longer devotion to another 
person, but to the relationality that constitutes the care-giver’s own self. 
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